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A 40-percent devaluation and its
multiplier effects could cost approxi-
mately 1 percent of the state’s total
employment, or about 75,000 jobs,
over the next three years. Because
the state has been gaining employ-
ment at an annual rate of 240,000
jobs per year, such a loss represents
about four month’s worth of growth.
Texas’ economy should continue
to expand in 1995, but the peso
devaluation will slow the state’s
growth. Before the devaluation,
Texas employment was predicted
to grow around 2.8 percent in 1995.
With a 40-percent devaluation of
the peso, growth near 2.5 percent
is more likely.
As the effects of the peso deval-
uation ripple through the Texas
economy, some industries will feel a
much greater impact than others. The
devaluation makes Texas exports
—sold in dollars—more expensive
in pesos and Mexican imports—
sold in pesos—relatively cheaper
in dollars.
In the near term, Mexico’s de-
mand for Texas goods and services









exas’ close economic ties with
Mexico will make the impact of
the peso’s plunge much stronger
here than in other parts of the
United States.
In the six weeks between
December 20, 1994, and February
1, 1995, the Mexican peso lost
roughly 40 percent of its value.
This dramatic devaluation should
have few long-term effects on the
level of U.S. employment, but it
could have a substantial influence
on the kinds of jobs people do
and where they do them. Nowhere
will these shifts be more evident
than in Texas.
Texas Effects
The short-term impact of the peso
devaluation could be four times
stronger in Texas than in the rest
of the United States. One-third of
U.S. exports to Mexico come from
Texas. As Texas’ largest foreign
trading partner, Mexico plays a
greater role in the Texas economy
than in the U.S. economy. Exclud-
ing trade with Mexican maquiladora
plants, Mexico receives 27 percent
of Texas’ merchandise exports,
compared with 6 percent of U.S.
merchandise exports.1 Exports to
Mexico represent nearly 2 percent
of Texas output but less than 0.5
percent of U.S. output.
“Texas’ economy should
continue to expand in
1995, but the peso
devaluation will slow
the state’s growth.”2
Other Texas firms may lose business
to Mexican imports, while Texas
industries that import goods and
services from Mexico will benefit
from relatively cheaper prices of
Mexican products.
Along the U.S.–Mexico border,
businesses are seeing less cross-
border shopping and tourism be-
cause of the peso’s loss of buying
power. The devaluation’s effect on
retailing, health care, tourism and
other service industries is difficult to
quantify because statisticians do not
measure international trade in ser-
vices at the state level. Figures on
merchandise exports, however, can
help predict how the devaluation




makers and electronics firms will be
the Texas industries hardest hit by
the devaluation, according to a
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
index that measures the sensitivity
of manufacturing industries to
devaluations of the peso.2 Table 1
ranks Texas manufacturing indus-
tries according to their peso-
sensitivity and shows the dollar
volume of their exports to Mexico.
The table reflects trade and produc-
tion patterns for 1993. Because of
their special import–export status,
maquiladora products are excluded.
Texas furniture and fixtures
manufacturing is the state’s most
peso-sensitive industry because
two-thirds of its total sales to
foreign countries go to Mexico.
Roughly 30 percent of Texas’
exports of electronics and transpor-
tation equipment goes to Mexico.
Among the less-sensitive manu-
facturing categories are industrial
machinery (including computer
equipment), petroleum and coal
products, textile mill products, and
printing and publishing. Firms in
these industries send a relatively
small share of their total exports to
Mexico. For instance, once exports
to maquiladoras are excluded, the
Texas industrial machinery industry
sends only 12 percent of its exports
to Mexico.
Conclusion
Some analysts who considered
the peso to be overvalued before
the devaluation now think Mexico’s
currency is undervalued. If so, then
the peso should recover some of
the ground it has lost over recent
weeks. Any improvement in the
value of the peso would reduce the
magnitude of the devaluation’s
effects but not their distribution.
Peso-sensitive industries and the
border region would still bear the





1 These estimates reflect an adjustment
for exports to Mexican maquiladora
plants. We exclude exports to maquila-
doras from the export data because
those goods are only exported to Mexico
Table 1
Texas Industries’ Sensitivity to Changes in the Value of the Mexican peso
Peso Exports*
Sensitivity (millions of dollars)
Furniture and fixtures .988 $ 160.04
Transportation equipment .922 965.11
Electronics and electric equipment .811 1,543.58
Leather and leather products .699 61.17
Apparel and other textile products .628 156.02
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries .610 134.70
Lumber and wood products .609 134.28
Fabricated metal products .504 319.16
Primary metal industries .482 463.11
Stone, clay and glass products .455 50.79
Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products .413 283.75
Food and tobacco .379 996.51
Paper and allied products .351 454.75
Instruments and related products .326 228.69
Chemicals and allied products .228 665.38
Printing and publishing .203 54.85
Industrial machinery
(including computer equipment) .173 934.31
Petroleum and coal products .145 391.42
Textile mill products .124 83.08
All manufacturing .389 8,080.68
* These estimates of 1993 exports by industry exclude exports to Mexican maquiladora firms.
temporarily. Under a typical maquila-
dora’s production-sharing agreement,
goods enter Mexico duty-free and ulti-
mately return to the United States duty-
free (the United States charges a duty
only on the non-U.S. content of the
products). We also exclude the U.S.
content of imports from maquiladoras
from the import data that are used in
the analysis.
In 1993, the most recent year for
which we have complete information,
U.S. exports to Mexico totaled $41.6
billion, of which the Mexican govern-
ment considered $15.9 billion to be
exports to maquiladoras. To derive
Texas exports to maquiladoras, we
assume that Texas exports to maquila-
doras in each industry are proportional
to U.S. exports to maquiladoras for that
industry. Thus, if maquiladora exports
represent 10 percent of U.S. exports in
a given industry, we assume that ma-
quiladora exports represent 10 percent
of Texas exports in that industry.
2 Lori L. Taylor developed this index,
using work by W. Michael Cox and
John K. Hill in “Effects of the Lower
Dollar on U.S. Manufacturing: Industry
and State Comparisons,” Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas Economic Review, March
1988. A technical appendix detailing
her modifications to the Cox–Hill





beginning in the early 1980s. The
weakened correlation offers more
evidence with which to evaluate
the relationship between inflation
and monetary restraint. It suggests
that either the economy’s reaction
to monetary policy has changed, or
the conduct of monetary policy
itself has changed in aspects such
as policy timing or magnitude.
The Price Puzzle
Why did inflation increase follow-
ing tightenings of monetary policy
in the 1960s and 1970s, and why
did this pattern begin to diminish in
the early 1980s?
The positive correlation between
the federal funds rate and subse-
quent inflation, or price puzzle,
poses a conundrum for traditional
macroeconomic theory and monetary
practice. According to conventional
theory, a tightening of monetary
policy, by slowing the growth rate
of money and raising short-term
interest rates, should result in a
decline in the demand for goods
and services in the economy and,
hence, lead to a reduction in the
inflation rate. Typically, a tightening
of monetary policy is implemented
through an increase in the federal
funds rate.
There are two alternative expla-
nations of the so-called price puzzle
—one consistent with traditional
beliefs about the effect of monetary
contractions, the other inconsistent
with traditional beliefs. We call the
nontraditional theory a cost–push
explanation. In short, the cost–push
erode the value of bonds.
The bond-market reaction to the
Federal Reserve’s move to tighten
monetary policy was disappointing
from a central banker’s perspective.
After all, the Federal Reserve tight-
ened monetary policy with the
explicit aim of moving early enough
to ensure that the economy would
not overheat and generate inflation.
What prompted bond markets to
react the way they did?
History may provide the answer.
Chart 1 plots the federal funds rate
and the inflation rate, as measured
by the gross domestic product
deflator, over the period 1960–93.
From Chart 1, it appears that the
federal funds rate and inflation
move together. That is, when the
federal funds rate increases, inflation
rises as well. Perhaps even more
perplexing is that the correlation
between the federal funds rate and
subsequent inflation is positive
(Table 1). This correlation appears
to suggest that when the Federal
Reserve moves to tighten monetary
policy by raising the federal funds
rate, inflation rises!
Note also from Table 1 and
Chart 1 that this positive correlation
between inflation and the federal
funds rate seems to have diminished,
Table 1
Correlation Between Federal Funds





* This correlation is obtained from a regression of the
funds rate on subsequent inflation. The correlation for
the 1982:4–93:4 is not statistically different from zero.
(See the Emery–Balke article in note 1 for further
details.)
Subsequent inflation equals the average annualized rate
of inflation over the subsequent eight quarters.
A
fter five years of declining interest
rates, the Federal Reserve began
to increase the federal funds rate in
early February 1994 with the goal
of alleviating potential inflationary
pressures. Somewhat surprisingly,
the bond-market reaction was nega-
tive: long-term bond yields increased
50 basis points over the next four
weeks. At that time, market analysts
attributed much of the run-up in
yields to worries that inflation would
increase during the next year and
Chart 1
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explanation says that a rise in the
federal funds rate boosts the interest-
rate costs of some firms. These
increases, in turn, are passed onto
consumers in the form of higher
prices. Thus, a hike in the federal
funds rate causes inflation to rise.
Although traditional theories about
the effect of contractionary mone-
tary policy might allow such cost–
push effects, these are typically
believed to be small, temporary and
swamped by the negative aggregate
demand consequences of a mone-
tary contraction. Still, some observ-
ers see the positive correlation in
Chart 1 as evidence that higher in-
terest rates are a fundamental cause
of higher inflation.
The second explanation, consis-
tent with traditional economic
theory, we term the too-little, too-
late Fed. Here, a monetary tighten-
ing has the traditional effect: holding
everything else constant, increases
in the federal funds rate slow money
growth and lessen the demand for
goods and services. As a result,
inflationary pressures subside. The
price puzzle arises because the Fed-
eral Reserve has information about
building inflationary pressures—
such as excessive output growth,
low unemployment rates and rising
commodity prices—and increases
the funds rate before inflation begins
to increase. However, the federal
funds rate is not raised sufficiently,
or soon enough, to prevent actual
inflation from increasing. The end
result is that inflation increases even
after the federal funds rate increases
—not because the rate increased
but because it did not increase
enough! Of course, had the Federal
Reserve not moved to tighten, infla-
tion would have been even higher.
Distinguishing between these two
explanations is important for both
investors and policymakers. If higher
interest rates were a cause of rising
inflation, policymakers at the Federal
Reserve would need to reevaluate
their anti-inflation policies. Addi-
tionally, with a clearer understand-
ing of the links between monetary
restraint and inflation, both investors
and policymakers would be able
to make better informed decisions.
Solving the Puzzle
To determine which of these
two alternative explanations is, in
fact, correct, one must strip out the
systematic response of the federal
funds rate to other economic develop-
ments. For example, the Federal
Reserve systematically tightens
policy in response to higher infla-
tion signals and systematically
loosens policy during recessions.
These systematic responses make it
difficult to determine the indepen-
dent, or exogenous, effects of federal
funds rate increases. By examining
the response of prices to indepen-
dent changes in the federal funds
rate, we can determine which of the
two explanations is more plausible.
For the too-little, too-late Fed ex-
planation, after accounting for the
Federal Reserve’s systematic response
to signals of future inflation, a
federal funds rate increase should be
followed by the traditional response
of a decline in prices. On the other
hand, for the cost–push explana-
tion, even after accounting for the
systematic response of the federal
funds rate, an increase in the federal
funds rate should result in an in-
crease in prices.
Using data from 1960–79, Chart 2
shows the price level’s positive
response to an increase in the funds
rate (controlling for the Federal
Reserve’s systematic reaction to past
movements in output, inflation and
the federal funds rate).1 In Chart 2,
we see evidence that prices still
increase after a hike in the federal
funds rate. This evidence seems to
support the cost–push explanation.
However, the Federal Reserve
may have additional information
about building inflationary pres-
sures—information not captured in
just the past movements of output,
inflation and the federal funds rate.
If such were the case, the unsystem-
atic or exogenous component of
the funds rate would be mismeas-
ured because it would not take into
account that the Federal Reserve
systematically responds to this other
information. Indeed, variables such
as commodity prices and interest-
rate spreads have been shown to
contain information about future
inflation and are monitored by the
Federal Reserve. Chart 3 shows that
an increase in the federal funds rate
results in a decline in prices after
accounting for the systematic re-
sponse of the federal funds rate to
these additional indicators of future
inflation. This evidence is consis-
tent with the conventional view of
monetary effects and inconsistent
with the cost–push explanation.
Thus, the evidence suggests that
during the 1960s and 1970s the
Federal Reserve would tighten
Chart 2
Response of Prices
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Chart 3
Response of Prices
To Federal Funds Rate Shock
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policy in response to building in-
flationary pressures but not by
enough, or early enough, to prevent
inflation from actually increasing.
Of course, if the Federal Reserve
had not tightened policy, inflation
would have increased even more.
Evidence also suggests that, while
federal funds rate increases may
increase borrowing costs and cause
upward pressure on some prices,
the net effect of funds rate hikes
on prices is negative, supporting
the traditional view of monetary
policy’s effects.
Monetary Policy
Since the Early 1980s
Returning to Chart 1, it also
appears that the positive correlation
between the funds rate and infla-
tion weakened somewhat during
the 1980s. Indeed, the regression
results presented in Table 1 confirm
that there is almost no relationship
between the funds rate and subse-
quent inflation for the 1983–93
period. For some reason, then,
monetary policy tightening has not
been associated with subsequently
higher inflation since the early
1980s.2
What accounts for this change?
One possible explanation consis-
tent with traditional theory is that
the Federal Reserve has been more
determined to control inflation in
the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, since
the disinflation engineered by the
Federal Reserve in the early 1980s,
the Federal Reserve has more force-
fully emphasized its commitment
to achieving price stability.3
On a tactical level, policy has
shifted toward increasing the federal
funds rate earlier, before inflationary
pressures build, and by a sufficient
amount to keep actual inflation from
rising.4 Because the Federal Reserve
has successfully tightened monetary
policy, inflation does not increase.
And the funds rate–inflation correla-
tion disappears.
An alternative explanation for the
lack of a price puzzle in the 1980s
may be that Federal Reserve policy-
makers have not had to confront
the same types of economic shocks
they faced during the 1970s. During
the 1970s, for example, the U.S.
economy was hit with several large
oil price shocks. Oil price shocks
and, more generally, negative supply
shocks present policymakers with a
difficult choice because such
shocks lead to lower output and
higher inflation. How should mone-
tary policymakers respond? Should
policy be tightened to prevent in-
flation from rising or loosened to
prevent output from falling? Evi-
dence suggests that the Federal
Reserve faced these difficult situa-
tions by raising the federal funds
rate but not by enough to keep
inflation from rising.
During the 1980s and early 1990s,
it may simply be the case that there
have been few negative supply
shocks. Such an environment may
have made it easier for the Federal
Reserve to focus on its inflation-
fighting objectives. In other words,
the Federal Reserve’s increased
commitment to price stability may
not have yet been tested, leaving
open the question of how the
Federal Reserve will respond when
decisions get tough.
Conclusions
In the past, hikes in the federal
funds rate have often been followed
by increases in inflation. This posi-
tive correlation presents a paradox
—a so-called price puzzle—because
it is inconsistent with traditional
macroeconomic theory, which
predicts that inflation will fall in
response to a monetary policy tight-
ening. While the price puzzle is
particularly evident for the 1960s and
1970s, in the 1980s and 1990s the
response of inflation to the federal
funds rate has been close to zero.
The evidence cited here suggests
that there is a simple explanation
for these phenomena. Historically,
the Federal Reserve has increased
the federal funds rate in anticipa-
tion of inflation. Unfortunately, it
has sometimes failed to increase the
funds rate by enough to prevent
inflation from actually rising. Simply
put, past monetary restraint has
been too little, too late. Evidence
that the price puzzle has diminished
since the early 1980s suggests that
the Federal Reserve is now more
successful in anticipating and




1 The model is a simple vector autore-
gression. (For further details see Nathan
S. Balke and Kenneth M. Emery, “Under-
standing the Price Puzzle,” Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic Re-
view, Fourth Quarter 1994.) The results
indicate that the Federal Reserve sys-
tematically increases the funds rate in
response to unexpected jumps in output
or the price level.
2 On the other hand, inflation does not fall
when the federal funds rate increases,
as traditional theory would predict.
Again, though, once we control for the
systematic response of the federal funds
rate to commodity price and interest-
rate spread changes, prices decline in
response to a hike in the federal funds
rate.
3 The Federal Reserve’s rationale for this
increased commitment is the view that
high rates of inflation during the 1970s
significantly damaged the U.S. economy.
4 One valuable lesson of the 1970s was
that monetary policy, if it is to be used
successfully to prevent inflation from
rising, must be tightened long before
inflation pressures build. In other words,
it must be successful at taking away the
punch bowl before the party gets out of
hand.6
banks grow stronger and more opti-
mistic about their potential borrow-
ers, they are returning to less severe
underwriting standards, and lend-
ing is reverting to earlier levels to
meet demand.
The credit crunch ended in 1992
when lending activity began to
recover. By year-end 1992, the
Eleventh District’s large banks had
begun to report increases in loans
(Chart 1). By year-end 1993, the
recovery had expanded to include
small Eleventh District banks as well.
During the first three quarters of
1994, District lending was increas-
ing at an annual rate of 6.7 percent.
The business lending expansion
came as a result of positive shifts in
both supply and demand. What has
happened in the Eleventh District
mirrors what bankers reported in
the nationwide Senior Loan Officer
Opinion Survey on Bank Lending
Practices (SLOOS), conducted by
the Federal Reserve System. That
survey reported that the demand
for credit began to increase in the
second quarter of 1992, and credit
standards began to ease signifi-
cantly by the third quarter of 1993.
Demand went up as borrowers
sought funds to finance inventory
increases, to invest in new plants
and equipment and to finance
mergers and acquisitions.
Competition and Credit Quality
An alternative view is that loans
are expanding because banks have
lowered their credit standards in
response to competitive pressures.
Banker surveys indicate that com-
petition among banks has been
intense recently. This view, how-
ever, implicitly assumes that the
demand for credit from qualified
borrowers is constant or growing
more slowly than loan supply. And,
when faced with excess supply of
loanable funds, banks lower their
credit standards to unreasonable
levels rather than invest the funds
in other instruments.
The view that competition leads to




Too Much of a
Good Thing?
 he lending recovery in the Fed-
 eral Reserve’s Eleventh District,
while celebrated by most, to some
signals trouble ahead.1 For some
observers, the lending recovery re-
kindles memories of the mid-1980s
boom that preceded the biggest
wave of bank failures since the
Great Depression. Bank failures in
the 1980s, however, resulted not
from loan growth but from a sub-
stantial decline in credit standards
that netted huge loan losses when
the regional economy fell into re-
cession. In the current recovery,
credit standards have eased some-
what but not to the dangerous levels
of the past.
The Credit Cycle in the Southwest
Lending in the Eleventh District
contracted sharply from 1985 through
the early 1990s. The lending con-
traction, called a credit crunch,
coincided with the severe regional
recession that ran from 1985 to 1987
and the toughest years of the bank-
ing crisis—1988 through 1990 (Clair
and Tucker 1993). The banking
crisis forced District bankers to im-
pose strict underwriting standards
and retrench lending operations
until their banks’ financial condition
improved. In many cases, even
these efforts could not save banks
from failure. The regional recession
also lowered the creditworthiness
of many would-be borrowers, and
numerous business failures pushed
some borrowers into default. Both
loan supply from banks and loan
demand from qualified borrowers
were depressed.
Today, loan demand and supply
in the Eleventh District have reversed
their decline. The District’s economy
began to improve in 1987 and has
since continued on an upward trend.
A growing economy generates in-
creased demand for credit. Because
the general economic outlook is
positive, borrowers look more credit-
worthy to lenders. In addition, District
banks have regained their financial
health, with 97 percent of banking
assets held at healthy banks.2 As
“Those that cannot
remember the past are
condemned to repeat it.”
—George Santayana7
plained as a post hoc, ergo propter hoc
fallacy, which translates as “after
this, necessarily because of this.”
Loan defaults do increase following
periods of loan growth, but the two
are not necessarily related. Lending
follows the business cycle with a
slight lag. Loan defaults are counter-
cyclical, falling during expansions
and rising during recessions. As a
result, as the economy proceeds
through a series of business cycles,
observers of the banking industry
see alternating periods of increased
loan growth followed by increased
loan defaults. They draw the con-
clusion that the loan growth was
the cause of the loan defaults with-
out proving the connection.
There is evidence to the con-
trary—that is, competition has not
lowered credit quality. Banker
surveys tell us that competition has
lowered loan prices but not under-
writing standards. Bank examiners
report that they have not seen signs
of relaxed loan standards. Finally,
while some banking industry analysts
are concerned about lower bank
stock prices, their expectations are
based on forecasts of lower profit
margins and not expectations of
higher loan losses.
Competition has lowered prices,
not lowered credit standards. Nation-
wide, three times as many banks
have cut their profit spreads as have
cut their collateral requirements,
and nearly twice as many were
cutting their spreads as were easing
their loan requirements, according
to the August SLOOS (Chart 2).3 In
addition, surveys of business lend-
ing terms show that collateral re-
quirements for short-term business
loans are unchanged. Although
some loan covenants and collateral
requirements have eased, this easing
has been less common and prob-
ably reflects a return to normal
risk–return standards after the ex-
cessive tightening caused by the
banking crisis.
Although bank examinations are
confidential, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has
substantially reduced its estimate of
the number of problem banks.
Since the end of 1991, the number
of problem banks nationwide fell
from 1,016 to 338 by mid-year 1994.4
Within the Eleventh District, Federal
Reserve bank examiners see no
trend toward unsound banking prac-
tices among the 51 state-member
banks they supervise.
Bank stock analysts at such firms
as Dean Witter Reynolds, Smith
Chart 1
Growth of Commercial Loans at Large and Other District Banks
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“Banker surveys tell us that
competition has lowered
loan prices but not under-
writing standards.”8
Barney, Salomon Brothers and Merrill
Lynch do not cite credit quality
issues as a reason for downgrading
some large bank stocks. The analysts
are worried about the effects of
higher interest rates and banks’
diminishing opportunities to improve
their financial performance in the
near term. While recovering from the
banking crisis, banks substantially
improved their earnings by working
off troubled assets and reducing
loan losses. Now balance sheets are
clean and competition is picking
up, leaving banks with narrower
profit margins that will slow the
growth of future bank profits.
Is Rapid Loan Growth a Problem
In the Eleventh District?
Further empirical evidence shows
that loan growth is related to deteri-
oration in loan quality only under
extreme conditions not currently
apparent in the Eleventh District.
Research (Clair 1992) shows that
rapid growth leads to lower loan
quality only if the following con-
ditions are met:
1. The banks had below-average
capital ratios.
2. Loans were growing at least
four times as fast as state per-
sonal income.
3. The increased lending was
generated by heightened mar-
keting to new and existing
bank customers, called inter-
nally generated lending, and
was not the result of mergers,
acquisitions, loan purchases or
asset transfers.
Historical data show that rapid
growth by banks that met these
three criteria experienced a small
but statistically significant increase in
loan chargeoffs after a three-year lag.
An analysis of current banking
conditions in the Eleventh District
finds that recent loan expansion does
not fit these three criteria and should
not cause concern. The rapidly
growing banks in the Eleventh Dis-
trict are financially healthy. In addi-
tion, a great deal of the loan growth,
especially at the largest District
banks, is the result of mergers,
acquisitions, loan purchases and
asset transfers.
Only about one-fifth of banks in
the Eleventh District are growing
rapidly, and they are financially
healthy. Chart 3 shows the distribu-
tion of banks by their loan growth
rate from the fourth quarter of 1992
to the third quarter of 1994.5 Only
229 banks grew at an annual rate
in excess of 20 percent. By and
large, the fastest growing banks are
Chart 2
Changes in Terms of Lending at Large U.S. Banks, August 1994
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“While recovering from the
banking crisis, banks
substantially improved
their earnings by working
off troubled assets and
reducing loan losses.”9
small and financially healthy (Chart
4). Furthermore, the expansion of
their loan portfolios has been well-
diversified across all major types of
loans.
Analysis of the 10 largest District
banks shows that loan growth has
been primarily the result of acquisi-
tion. Historically, growth through
acquisition is not correlated to de-
clines in loan quality. After adjust-
ing for acquisitions, mergers and
net loan purchases, nine of the top
10 banks reported loan expansion
generated through increased mar-
keting efforts to new and existing
customers of less than 20 percent.
Only one large bank reported
adjusted loan growth in excess of
20 percent, and it is a financially
healthy bank.
A similar study of U.S. banks
shows that banks with high-quality
loan portfolios are the ones that are
growing relatively faster and that
banks with above-median growth
rates have the greater reserves for
absorbing loan losses (Klemme
1994). Among a sample of U.S. banks
that were in existence from the first
quarter of 1993 through the third
quarter of 1994, those with the lowest
troubled asset ratios reported higher
loan growth. In addition, banks with
relatively high loan growth have not
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Distribution of Eleventh District
Banks by Loan Growth Rates,
Fourth-Quarter 1992–Third-Quarter 1994*
Percent growth, annual rate
“Historically, growth
through acquisition is not
correlated to declines in
loan quality.”
Chart 4




    












* Excludes banks with more than $1 billion in total loans.10
———, and Paula Tucker (1993), “Six
Causes of the Credit Crunch,” Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic Review,
Third Quarter, 1–19.
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Notes
1 The Eleventh Federal Reserve District
includes Texas, northern Louisiana and
southern New Mexico.
2 A healthy bank is defined as profitable,
with troubled assets less than 3 percent
of total assets and a capital ratio in
excess of 6 percent.
3 Eleventh District SLOOS results are not
reported to maintain the confidentiality
of the small sample of respondents.
4 Unfortunately, Eleventh District data on
the number of problem banks are un-
available.
5 Banks with total loans of $1 billion or
more have been dropped from this
analysis because their extensive merger
activity biases the data.
“Vigilance in main-
taining credit quality
is necessary as the first
line of defense against
future banking crises.”
The Southwest Economy is pub-
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and have a higher ratio of loan loss
reserves to noncurrent loans.
Misplaced Concerns or Foresight?
There appears to be little reason
to worry about the recovery in busi-
ness loan demand in the near term.
This conclusion is based on the
sound financial condition of the
rapidly expanding banks. Increased
competition for new loans has de-
creased profit margins, but easing
of underwriting terms has been
modest. In general, there has been
no widespread deterioration of
credit standards or credit quality.
Why, then, are some prominent
bankers—including Joseph May, the
president of Robert Morris Associ-
ates, the professional society of com-
mercial lenders—raising concerns
about repeating the mistakes of the
1980s? They realize that inevitably,
the economy will enter into a reces-
sion at some time in the future,
causing some borrowers to default.
They know that eventually, banks
will experience the downside of
another credit cycle. Bankers who
lived through the last banking crisis
want bankers to be ready to weather
the next downturn without the tur-
moil experienced in the past decade.
Preserving the quality of the loan
portfolio protects the bank, its share-
holders, creditors and depositors
from unanticipated losses resulting
from borrowers’ defaults. While
worries about underwriting standards
are premature in the current environ-
ment, business environments can
change during the life of a loan,
which is often a long-term commit-
ment. Vigilance in maintaining
credit quality is necessary as the
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Beyond the Border
perceive increasing risks in the Mexican
market, but returns were not increasing
accordingly, so investors took their
money elsewhere. Foreign reserves fell
from around $25 billion at the end of
1993 to about $16 billion in July 1994
(Chart 2).
The election of President Ernesto
Zedillo in August 1994 brought new
confidence to Mexico’s policies and
boosted foreign reserves and the peso.
Afterward, however, there were signs
of investor uncertainty, and money
began flowing out of Mexico again.
Without dramatically higher interest
rates, foreign reserves continued to
leave the country. On December 20,
under pressure from foreign exchange
markets and with dwindling foreign
exchange reserves, Mexico loosened its
exchange rate band. The next day, after
investor’s made a run on the peso,
Mexico abandoned the exchange rate
band entirely.
If Mexico had increased interest rates
after the 1994 presidential elections,
perhaps the country could have avoided
the lost credibility and higher short-run
inflation caused by abandoning the
exchange rate policy. But at the time,
many analysts were predicting higher
investor confidence and appreciation
of the peso with the continuation of
policies under the Zedillo administration.
Mexico might have avoided its ex-
change rate problems by letting the
peso float after the elections. A floating
exchange rate allows a country to
weather domestic and international
economic shocks without dramatic
changes in domestic monetary policy
and without casting doubt on the credi-
bility of basic policies. Now that Mexico
is floating its exchange rate, economic
ups and downs will not generate specu-
lation against any particular exchange
rate policy. As long as monetary restraint
continues, inflation—over the long
run—will remain moderate.
— David M. Gould
William C. Gruben
CHART 2￿
Mexico’s Stock of Net International Reserves, 1994
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early stages of reform, Mexico could
keep exchange rate volatility low and
give investors a simple means of moni-
toring Mexican monetary policy. If ex-
pected inflation was higher in Mexico
than in the United States or prospects
for growth weakened relative to those
of the United States, investors’ would
take dollars from Mexico and seek
better returns in the United States. This
capital movement would lead to upward
pressure on the exchange rate as people
who held pesos bought U.S. dollars. If
the exchange rate stayed within the
band, Mexico would have to tighten
monetary policy and increase interest
rates to attract dollars back into the
country. As long as the exchange rate
policy remained credible and Mexico
adhered to it, analysts could watch the
movement of foreign reserves and
anticipate what would happen to
monetary policy.
Of course, exchange rate policy alone
does not make low inflation credible.
Low inflation is made credible only
through low and stable monetary growth.
Over the long run, monetary policy is
what keeps exchange rate policy credible,
not the other way  around. If monetary
policy is too loose and is inconsistent
with maintaining the exchange rate,
foreign reserves leave the country.
Without any foreign reserves to defend
the exchange rate, the exchange rate
policy has to be abandoned.
From 1987 through 1993, Mexico’s
monetary policy had been consistent
with low inflation and maintaining
policymakers’ exchange rate targets.
Inflation fell from a high of nearly 160
percent in 1987 to around 7 percent
in 1994. During 1994, however, poli-
tical uncertainty in Mexico and rising
interest rates in the United States created
pressures that began to drain Mexican
foreign reserves. Investors began to
The Roots of Mexico’s
Peso Crisis
T
he recent peso devaluation and vola-
tility have unnerved international
financial markets and raised questions
about the viability of the Mexican eco-
nomy. The key to understanding the
crisis and the events that led up to it lies
in understanding its roots in Mexico’s
economic reform, especially the Mexican
exchange rate policy.
During the mid-1980s and well before
the passage of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mexico
began a drive to become more com-
petitive in international markets. Mexico
liberalized rules on trade and foreign
investment, privatized public firms and
reduced unnecessary regulation. Although
Mexico’s transformation into a more
open economy was by no means com-
plete, the country had made significant
strides toward freer markets.
As Mexico began to open markets,
it also sought to curb inflation. The key
element of its monetary policy was
the use of the exchange rate as a nominal
anchor—that is, Mexico would keep its
domestic prices tethered to international
prices by targeting the nominal exchange
rate. During the initial stages of reform,
the exchange rate was fixed to the
dollar. Later, the exchange rate was
held to a preannounced rate of daily
depreciation. In 1991, the exchange rate
was allowed to float within a widening
band. At first, the top of the band rose
20 centavos (0.0002 new pesos) per
dollar per day, then the band was
increased to 40 centavos (0.0004 new
pesos) per dollar per day (Chart 1).
By keeping the exchange rate closely
tied to the dollar, especially during the12
Regional Update
similar changes in the state’s economy.
The components of the Texas Leading
Index are the average weekly hours of
production workers in manufacturing, an
index of help-wanted advertising, initial
claims for unemployment insurance, in-
flation-adjusted retail sales, an index of
stock prices of companies based in Texas,
the inflation-adjusted price of West
Texas Intermediate crude oil, the number
of permits issued to drill oil and gas
wells, the U.S. leading index and a Texas
export-weighted value of the dollar.
Changes in the component series are
weighted and then added together to get
the change in the leading index. New
unemployment claims and the Texas
value of the dollar contribute negatively
to the index, so that a rise in these
variables results in a decline in their net
contribution to the change in the index.
—Keith R. Phillips
FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE DATA
For more information on employment data,
see “Reassessing Texas Employment Growth”
(Southwest Economy, July/August 1993). For
more information on TIPI, see “The Texas Indus-
trial Production Index” (Dallas Fed Economic
Review, November 1989). For more information
on the Texas Leading Index and its components,
see “The Texas Index of Leading Indicators:
A Revision and Further Evaluation” (Dallas Fed
Economic Review, July 1990).
On-line economic data and articles are avail-
able on the Dallas Fed’s electronic bulletin board,
FEDFLASH (214-922-5199 or 800-333-1953).
REGIONAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Texas Employment Total Nonfarm Employment
Private
Leading TIPI Construc- Manufac- Govern- Service- New
Index Total Mining tion turing ment Producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
12/94 111.7 111.820 158.5 398.1 1,006.6 1,440.2 4,855.3 7,858.7 1,717.3 669.5
11/94 111.2 111.637 159.8 393.9 1,003.8 1,433.7 4,831.4 7,822.6 1,712.5 668.0
10/94 111.2 112.703 160.6 389.9 1,002.4 1,430.7 4,817.2 7,800.8 1,708.0 663.1
9/94 111.3 113.116 162.8 388.7 1,001.6 1,432.6 4,814.9 7,800.6 1,700.5 658.6
8/94 111.6 113.311 161.5 384.0 999.9 1,438.3 4,808.3 7,792.0 1,686.8 657.4
7/94 111.0 113.262 160.9 382.8 998.4 1,424.2 4,791.0 7,757.3 1,678.7 658.2
6/94 111.5 113.091 160.3 380.1 999.0 1,407.8 4,766.2 7,713.4 1,671.6 654.5
5/94 110.5 112.866 161.0 375.7 999.1 1,411.0 4,756.6 7,703.4 1,668.4 651.7
4/94 111.4 112.937 163.2 375.2 998.4 1,405.3 4,741.7 7,683.8 1,665.1 648.8
3/94 110.7 112.031 163.9 374.1 997.3 1,400.3 4,712.4 7,648.0 1,657.1 643.8
2/94 110.5 111.582 164.9 372.3 994.4 1,400.7 4,695.0 7,627.3 1,647.1 642.6
1/94 110.0 111.166 165.7 374.0 993.1 1,398.0 4,690.5 7,621.3 1,640.7 640.9
Total Nonfarm Employment
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Regional Update is a new feature that
will appear in each issue of The South-
west Economy. The section will identify
current economic trends in the region
and present highlights of data produced
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
This issue explains several measures of
economic activity that will appear regu-
larly in this column.
Nonfarm Employment. The broad
coverage and timeliness of the nonfarm
employment data make this one of the
most relied upon economic series avail-
able at the regional level. The raw data
are produced by state agencies in co-
operation with the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics. The Dallas Fed performs
several adjustments to the data to reduce
the impact of annual revisions and
increase the data’s reliability.
TIPI. The Texas Industrial Production
Index is a measure of output in the
state’s manufacturing, mining and public
utilities sectors. The index, which has
been produced by the Dallas Fed since
1958, is based primarily on movements
in hours worked and electric power
usage in the separate sectors.
Texas Leading Index. The Texas Lead-
ing Index is designed to signal upcom-
ing turning points in the Texas economy.
For example, a prolonged decline in the
index signals that a weakening of the
state’s economy is likely. The index
comprises nine different indicators that
tend to weaken or strengthen before